LEMOSCHARLES_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/2018 11:24 AM

PUBLIC PROGRAMS, PRIVATE
FINANCING
MARGARET H. LEMOS* & GUY-URIEL CHARLES**
I
INTRODUCTION
What sorts of organizations should we rely on to deliver goods and services
to the public? Economic theory typically divides the universe of options into
three sectors: the private market, the public sector, and the nonprofit or
philanthropic sector.1 Each sector has unique strengths and weaknesses, and
none is capable of dealing effectively with the full range of social problems. The
interesting question has always been how to allocate resources and
responsibilities among the different sectors so as to harness the strengths and
compensate for the weaknesses of each type. One might approach that question
by thinking about how organizations from different sectors can complement each
other: government, for example, might play a valuable role in correcting private
market failures.2 But it also is possible to imagine hybrid arrangements in which
different types of organizations work together, creating a sum that is greater than
the whole of its parts. For example, many advocates of privatization argue that
the government can deliver public goods more efficiently if it relies on private
firms to do some or all of the work.3 On that view, combining the government’s
political decision-making processes and power of compulsory taxation with
market competition and profit motive produces results that surpass what either
the public or private sector could accomplish in isolation.
This article examines a different approach to hybridization—one in which forprofit investment and/or philanthropic donations are used to fund government.
The first combination, commonly known as a “public-private partnership,” has
been prevalent in other parts of the world at least since the 1990s, and is on the
rise in the United States.4 The second, dubbed “patriotic philanthropy” by one of
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1. See generally, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988) (situating
nonprofits alongside government and the private market in a three-sector economy).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1030–34 (2013)
(describing efficiency rationales for privatization of government functions).
4. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: GLOBAL P3
LANDSCAPE 9–10 (Sept. 8, 2014) (describing the expanding public-private partnership market in the
U.S.).
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its most prominent practitioners, likewise shows signs of growth.5 Public-private
partnerships have received substantial attention in the already-vast literature on
the privatization of government functions.6 Most treatments, however, focus on
the promise and peril of relying on profit-motivated firms to produce or deliver
public services and amenities; the implications of private financing are of
secondary concern. Meanwhile, patriotic philanthropy has flown almost entirely
below the academic radar, perhaps because it is difficult to find fault with gifts,
or because the phenomenon is decentralized and difficult to track.7
The goal of this article is to begin to trace some of the consequences of public
reliance on private funding. Commentators focused on campaign finance and
lobbying have explored similar questions that arise when public officials are
dependent on private money for political support.8 Those explorations provide
some insights into the incentives of government officials who face, for example,
the prospect of large donations to support new public initiatives. But private
financing for government programs also raises a distinct set of concerns about
government capacity, and about the important differences between modes of
funding that are collective and compulsory, on the one hand, and individualized
and voluntary, on the other. We cannot hope to give those issues comprehensive
treatment in this short essay. Our aim, rather, is to stimulate a conversation about
the values at stake in decisions about how—and by whom—public services are
funded.
The discussion that follows proceeds in three parts. Part I sketches the
conventional divisions between for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit
organizations, highlighting some of the most critical advantages and
disadvantages of each type. Part II describes public-private partnerships and
patriotic philanthropy in more detail. Both hybrid forms appear at first blush to
be best-of-both-worlds combinations of public capacity and private initiative. Yet
there are reasons for pessimism as well as optimism, and Part II outlines some of
5. See Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing the State with
Gifts to Government, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
6. See, e.g., Pamela Bloomfield, The Challenging Business of Long-Term Public-Private
Partnerships: Reflections on Local Experience, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 400 (2006); Dominique Custos &
John Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2010); John Forrer et al., Public-Private
Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 475 (2010); David W. Gaffey,
Outsourcing Infrastructure: Expanding the Use of Public-Private Partnerships in the United States, 39 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 351 (2010); Paul Landow & Carol Ebdon, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Authorities, and
Democratic Governance, 35 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 727 (2012). On privatization more
generally, see, for example, JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS,
PRIVATE MEANS (1989); GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Judy Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Michaels, supra note 3.
7. See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, at Part II.C (offering a descriptive account of patriotic
philanthropy and noting that, although private financing for public education has provoked significant
debate, most of it has been focused on the substance of philanthropic interventions rather than the fact
of private financing for government programs).
8. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2012).
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the relevant considerations. Part III considers the relationship between private
funding and the public treasury. It is tempting to view private financing for
government as a supplement to public revenues. That perspective suggests that
the effects of private financing should be, at worst, neutral; the public sector
should be left no worse off by an infusion of additional funds. We think that view
is mistaken. For a variety of reasons, private and public funds may operate as
substitutes, not supplements. Part III fleshes out that argument, explaining why
private funding may lead to redistributions or contractions of the public fisc.
II
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN A THREE-SECTOR ECONOMY
Economic theory distinguishes among three types of organizations that
provide goods and services to the public: for-profit enterprises, government, and
nonprofit or philanthropic organizations. The three types of organizations differ
in various ways, including how they derive revenue and what they can do with it.
Those differences, in turn, translate into distinctive strengths and weaknesses for
each type.
A. The Private Sector
Economists long have emphasized the capacity of the private market to devise
efficient means of satisfying individuals’ wants and needs. As Adam Smith wrote
in The Wealth of Nations, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
self-interest.”9 The lure of profit encourages managers to meet consumer
demands while minimizing cost. And competition among firms prevents
managers from maximizing profit by sacrificing quality or charging excessive
prices.
Despite their promise, markets can fail to allocate resources effectively,
resulting in a smaller pie than would exist under ideal conditions.10 There are
various types of market failure, most stemming from informational challenges;
two are particularly relevant to the discussion here.11 The first arises when there
is an information asymmetry between producers and consumers—when

9. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (Random House 1937) (quoted in WEISBROD,
supra note 1, at 45).
10. Julian Le Grand, The Theory of Government Failure, 21 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 423, 425 (1991)
(“[F]ormally, an allocation of resources is defined as allocatively efficient if it is impossible to re-allocate
resources in such a way more persons better off without making someone else worse off: a definition that
is also known (after its originator) as Pareto-efficiency.”).
11. See, e.g., Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation
Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107 (1979) (identifying some reasons for market failure including externalities,
public goods, information asymmetry, and distributional equity). For seminal discussions of market
failure, see, for example, JESSE BURKHEAD & JERRY MINER, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 97–144 (1971);
Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954).
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producers have more information than consumers about the nature, cost, and
quality of goods. In order for competition to combat opportunistic behavior by
producers, consumers must be able to distinguish better products from worse
ones, and to reward honest sellers by giving those sellers their business. That is
easy enough to do when the quality of products is easily observable; consumers
can judge for themselves whether one baker’s pies are tastier than another’s, and
spend their money accordingly. The challenge is that some indicia of quality
cannot be observed by consumers, or can only be observed with great difficulty.
Those sorts of informational challenges can crop up where it is difficult to gauge
whether another provider would have performed a particular service better.
Legal services offer a ready illustration: a client may find it hard to assess her
attorney’s performance—was a lawsuit won or lost because of or in spite of the
attorney?—or to determine whether another attorney might have been more
successful or more efficient with her hours.12 In circumstances like this, the profitdrive associated with the private market is not a feature but a bug. If producers
are pursuing their self-interest, the quest for profit gives them an incentive to cut
corners, pad bills, and so on.
A second type of market failure arises from the well-known problem of freeriders. The private market is likely to undersupply so-called collective or public
goods—products or services that can be enjoyed by many people regardless of
whether they have paid for them. Conventional examples include national
defense, environmental protection, and public sanitation measures. Individual
consumers may want those things but not be willing to pay for them, or to pay
the full cost. Instead, individuals may hope that others will pay and that they will
be able to enjoy the benefits for free. Because demand will appear to be low, the
private market will tend to produce less of collective goods and services than the
public actually wants and needs.13
Both types of market failures stand as impediments to an efficient allocation
of resources. But private markets have other limitations as well. Although
efficiency is the north star in most economic theory, it is not the only relevant
value; equity may matter, too. That is, one might care not only about the overall
size of the pie, but also how it is sliced and distributed among individuals. There
is little reason to believe that private markets are well-suited to serve values
associated with distributional equity. On the contrary, “most economists have
acknowledged that, even at a theoretic level, the income distribution generated
by a private market would not necessarily, or even probably, be ethically
desirable, even if all people began life with equal endowments of human and
12. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 46.
13. This can be understood as a different kind of informational asymmetry—one in which
consumers possess more information than producers. See id. at 6 (“Consumers, in the aggregate, may
highly value particular collective services . . . . But individual consumers may find that self-interest
dictates acting as if they cared little, in the hope that others will pay for the services. Consumers do not
have the incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay, by making voluntary payments, if they feel that
they can benefit from others’ contributions.”).
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material capital, but especially if they did not.”14
B. The Public Sector
Where private markets fall short—whether with regard to allocative
efficiency or distributional equity or both—government can offer a needed
curative. Indeed, economists often conceptualize government primarily, if not
exclusively, as a means of addressing the shortcomings of the private market. In
that framing, the private sector is the default; the role of government, and of
private philanthropy, is to cure market failures. One need not adopt that framing,
however—nor the implication that a free market is logically prior to the state—
to recognize that one of the functions of government may be to supply the goods
that private markets are unlikely to provide on their own.15
As compared to the private sector, the government offers a different set of
strengths and weaknesses. Government officials are paid fixed salaries; they do
not take home more money at the end of the year if they figure out a clever way
to cut costs, build a better widget, or drum up consumer demand. The upside is
that government may be able to avoid the first type of market failure described
above: When it comes to goods and services with difficult-to-observe qualities,
civil servants may be more trustworthy providers than the managers of for-profit
enterprises.16 And even if the government does not provide the good or service
itself, it can regulate in ways that minimize the risk of opportunistic behavior by
for-profit providers.17
In addition to the power to regulate, government possesses the power to tax,
to extract revenues from individuals who may not be willing to pay voluntarily.
That means that government can avoid free-rider problems—the second type of
market failure described above—simply by compelling individuals to contribute
to the financing of public goods. You do not want to chip in on the cost of national
defense, public schools and highways, or environmental-protection efforts? Too
bad. Taxes are compulsory, and they cannot be avoided on the ground that other
people, who may or may not be taxpayers, will also benefit from the services your
tax dollars support.18

14. BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 9 (1978).
15. See Barry Bozeman, Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 62 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 145 (2002) (challenging the market-failure framing).
16. See, e.g., WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 43–58
17. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (using concepts
of market failure to explain and evaluate regulations).
18. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“‘Compelled support of
government’—even those programs of government one does not approve—is of course perfectly
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.”); DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR. & LAURIE REYNOLDS,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 382 (2003) (“Taxes are imposed without consideration of whether the
individual taxpayer will benefit from the services to be funded by the tax.”).
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The government also assesses demand in a markedly different fashion than
the private market—by votes, as opposed to willingness and ability to pay. A
political decision process that relies on votes rather than payments “allows
everyone who is affected by the consumption and production of a good or a
service to have a say in its level of provision.”19 This feature can help government
overcome certain types of market failures, because if the consumption or
production of a good or service generates externalities—either positive or
negative—the political process can take those into account. Likewise, a “one
person, one vote” system can promote values associated with equity by weighing
everyone’s preferences equally, whereas the “one dollar, one vote” metric in the
private sector gives greater weight to those with more dollars to spend.20
The fact that the government is capable of stepping in to address market
failures does not mean that it will, of course. Moving from the private to the
public sector does not mean abandoning concerns about failure so much as
renaming them—and so the topic becomes government failure instead of market
failure.21 To begin with, the nature of the political process suggests that
government will only provide collective goods that enjoy majority support.22 But
it might fail even to do that. The same collective-action problems that can impede
effective private action also can get in the way of valuable government
interventions—even those that a majority of citizens would favor. As one
commentator observed, “[f]or government to act, substantial segments of the
public must be aroused, public officials must be informed, laws must be written,
majorities must be assembled, and programs must be put into action.”23 Those
challenges are particularly pronounced when the action in question will bestow

19. Le Grand, supra note 10, at 436.
20. Id.; see also WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 14, at 34–35 (discussing differences between oneperson-one-vote and one-dollar-one-vote demand mechanisms).
21. For extended discussions of government failure, see generally CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS
OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 34–102 (2d ed. 1993); Le Grand,
supra note 10; cf. Bozeman, supra note 15 (discussing a form of government failure that the author calls
“public value failures”). The vast literature on public-choice theory is also, of course, relevant to the
question of government failure. Seminal works include KENNETH JOSEPH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965); GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975).
22. Rob Reich, What are Foundations For?, BOSTON REV. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://bostonreview.net/
forum/foundations-philanthropy-democracy [https://perma.cc/JY9V-AQ35] (“If a majority of citizens
prefer police protection and a minority prefers arts funding, then politicians will vote to fund the police
and not the arts. Further, standard models of political behavior in a democracy predict that politicians
will fund the public goods preferred by majorities at a level that satisfies the “median voter,” who sits in
the middle of the political spectrum. . . . So public funding of the arts may generate plenty of Norman
Rockwell, but probably not avant-garde or radical art.”).
23. Lester M. Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward
a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, 16 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 29, 39 (1987).
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benefits on the public at large, or a large and diffuse segment of the public—as
will be the case for many collective goods.24 Just as individuals may prefer to freeride off of others’ willingness to pay for such goods, they may fail to contribute
to the political efforts, like organization and lobbying, that are necessary to spur
government to action.25
Finally, even when government acts, it may fail to act effectively, because the
same feature that makes government less likely to exploit unsuspecting
consumers—the absence of profit motive—also means that government agents
have weak incentives to innovate or to minimize costs.26
C. The Philanthropic Sector
The voluntary, or nonprofit, or philanthropic sector offers an alternative to
the private and public sectors, and shares features in common with both. Like
private-sector organizations, nonprofits have no power to compel action but must
rely on voluntary transfers from individuals and firms. Like government,
nonprofits, and the people who run them, are limited in their ability to take
advantage of any surpluses they produce.27
These features help shape the role that the voluntary sector can play in
relation to the private market and the state. On the one hand, the absence of a
profit motive reduces the incentives that nonprofit managers and other
philanthropists might have to use informational asymmetries to bilk unsuspecting
members of the public. As a result, nonprofits—like government—may be better
suited than private firms to provide goods and services that lack easily observable
indicia of quality. On the other hand, and in contrast to government, nonprofits
need not operate under majority rule, but can serve interests that are decidedly
minoritarian in orientation.28 Thus, private philanthropy can offer an important
supplement to government, particularly when it comes to producing collective
goods that lack majority support or powerful political backing.29 Rob Reich
explains:

24. See generally OLSON, supra note 21.
25. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 5 (“[G]overnment enterprises face political pressures that make
them excessively responsive to well-organized demands from industry and other pressure groups but far
less responsive to the interests of poorly organized groups such as consumers.”).
26. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 6; Michaels, supra note 3. Cf. WOLF, supra note 21, at 65
(“Where the revenues that sustain an activity are unrelated to the costs of producing it, more resources
may be used than necessary to produce a given output, or more of the nonmarket activity may be
provided than is warranted by the original market-failure reason for undertaking it in the first place.”).
27. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 41–42.
28. Id. at 6–7 (“In a democratic society in which governments tend to be responsive to majority
wants, there is a need for institutions that can respond to the demands of persons who feel intensely about
particular collective-type activities, such as the preservation of Carnegie Hall or other landmarks,
research on muscular dystrophy, or helping native Americans.”).
29. For an empirical analysis see Yoshiho Matsunaga & Naoto Yamauchi, Is the Government Failure
Theory Still Relevant?: A Panel Analysis Using US State Level Data, 75 ANN. PUB. COOP. ECON. 227
(2004).
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In a democratic state, one simple way to predict what public goods will be produced is
to look at which public goods are favored by a majority of citizens. . . . Foundations [and
other philanthropic organizations] can yield more idiosyncratic results. . . . In a
pluralistic democracy, people have diverse preferences about what kinds of goods to
supply through the direct expenditure of tax dollars. Powered by donor preferences and
free from the accountability logic of the market and democratic state, foundations can
help to provide a welcome pluralism of public goods. The diversity of goods supplied by
foundation grantees helps to create an ever evolving, contestatory, and diverse arena of
civil society. Such decentralization tempers government orthodoxy.30

The same features that contribute to the strengths of the voluntary sector also
feed into to its weaknesses, however—producing what one might think of as
voluntary failures.31 Because nonprofits have to rely on voluntary payments, they
run into a similar free-rider problem as the private market. Just like individuals
might balk at paying for a good or service if they could reap the same benefits for
free if others footed the bill, they might similarly hesitate before donating their
money to worthy causes, hoping that other donors would make up the slack. If
those potential other donors made the same calculation, the result would be
rampant under-funding for nonprofits and their projects. Indeed, the strongest
versions of free-rider theory would suggest that there should be very little private
philanthropy at all.32 That is plainly not the reality; the voluntary sector is alive
and well in the U.S., flush from a record-breaking $390 billion in donations in
2016.33 Nevertheless, the potential for free riding and other obstacles to collective
action stands as an impediment to funding collective goods with voluntary
individual donations.
Granted, nonprofits need not rely on an aggregation of modest gifts; all it
takes is one mega-rich philanthropist or foundation to cut through the Gordian
knot of organizational challenges and other transaction costs to get results.34 But
that possibility also highlights another limitation of the voluntary sector: its
reliance on wealthy individuals. As one commentator explains, private
philanthropy “inevitably vests most of the influence over the definition of
community needs in the hands of those in command of the greatest resources . . .
. The nature of the sector thus comes to be shaped by the preferences not of the
30. Reich, supra note 22.
31. Salamon, supra note 23, at 39 (linking the concept of “voluntary failure” to “inherent limitations
of the voluntary or nonprofit sector”).
32. TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 108 (1992) (“The large
number of contributors associated with many charities raises a conundrum. If charities are providing a
pure public good in their philanthropic activities, and if a large number of donors are relied upon for
contributions, then the group should be latent and, hence, not form. . . . Yet fund-raising charities exist.
Charities collect billions of dollars annually in the United States. . . . Clearly, the standard wisdom, drawn
from conventional theories of pure public goods, does not apply to charities.”).
33. Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA (June 12, 2017), https://givingusa.org/see-thenumbers-giving-usa-2017-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/7CE3-W5NB].
34. Cf. Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 27 (noting that “philanthropy is becoming
more top-heavy and donor-driven, with mega-rich ‘policy plutocrats’ ‘directing not only their money but
also their time, ideas, and political leverage toward influencing public policy’” (quoting Kristin A. Goss,
Policy Plutocrats: How America’s Wealthy Seek to Influence Government, 94 PS: POL. SCI. & POL’Y 442,
442 (July 2016))).
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community as a whole, but of its wealthy members. As a consequence, some
services favored by the wealthy, such as the arts, may be promoted, while others
desired by the poor are held back.”35
This problem is compounded in the U.S., at least, by the favorable tax
treatment of charitable donations, which amounts to a government subsidy for
donors’ chosen projects: The government permits individuals to forego paying a
certain amount in taxes by giving the money instead to the organizations of their
choice.36 As U.S. tax law is currently structured, the subsidy is only available to
those in higher income brackets who itemize their deductions, and its magnitude
increases as incomes and taxes climb higher.37 Some critics argue that the
consequence is a “plutocratic bias,” because “the favored beneficiaries of the
wealthy receive the lion’s share of the subsidy.”38 Others complain that “[m]oney
that would otherwise be available for tax revenue that could be democratically
directed is shielded from public control for private use.”39
A related set of critiques sounds in democracy. Philanthropy can have
profound consequences for many people, and yet those people have no means of
influencing, much less controlling, the behavior of the philanthropists. As one
skeptic put it, “[o]ur functioning democracy, as imperfect as it is, holds to the
ideal that all people should have an equal voice.”40 Philanthropy operates outside
of the democratic channels for public input, contestation, and deliberation;
success is measured in terms of results, not process.41
D. Hybridization
The picture sketched here suggests that the private, public, and voluntary
sectors sit alongside each other, operating as complements and sometimes as
substitutes. Yet there has always been some blending of the categories—hybrid
forms in which different types of organizations work together. The tax deduction
for charitable donations, described above, can be understood as one form of
hybridization, since it operates like a government subsidy for nonprofit
organizations. The government also supports nonprofits even more directly by

35. Salamon, supra note 23, at 41.
36. See generally, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Rob Reich, Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy, in GIVING WELL: THE ETHICS OF
PHILANTHROPY 177, 184 (Patricia Illingworth et al. eds., 2011).
39. Gara LaMarche, Democracy and the Donor Class, 34 DEMOCRACY J., Fall 2014, at 3–4; see also
Salamon, supra note 23, at 41 (“Since . . . private contributions are tax-deductible, . . . they have the effect
not only of allocating private expenditures, but also of allocating foregone public resources as well,
though without the benefit of any public decision process. Not only is this situation undemocratic, but it
can also create a self-defeating sense of dependency on the part of the poor since it gives them no say
over the resources that are spent on their behalf.”).
40. Robin Rogers, Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters, 48 SOCIETY 376, 377 (2011).
41. Id.
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contributing to them itself.42 As a result, private nonprofit organizations play a
significant role in delivering the services that the government funds with tax
revenues.43
Government also can and does use tax policy, favorable interest rates, and
other feats of financial wizardry to subsidize private for-profit enterprises.
Further, public services have increasingly been privatized, meaning that the
government relies on private firms to perform functions that would otherwise be
discharged by public-sector employees. In effect, the government takes on the
role of consumer who buys a product rather than making it.44
We are interested in hybridization of a different type: scenarios in which
government programs are funded by private actors, either via for-profit
investments or philanthropic donations, or some combination of the two. Such
arrangements often result in private actors taking over all or part of servicedelivery as well as financing, and in the discussion that follows we address the
consequences for both inputs and outputs. Our primary interest, however, is in
the consequences of private financing for the public sector. Although there is no
shortage of scholarly and popular commentary on the relationship among the
three sectors described above—and between public and private more generally—
the bulk of it focuses on questions of who or what is delivering goods and services
to the public. Financing tends to fly under the radar, not because it is
unimportant, but because commentators often assume that collecting and
spending tax revenue is the irreducible minimum that government must do
itself.45 That assumption, it turns out, is false. The remainder of this article
considers the implications.
III
FOR-PROFIT AND PHILANTHROPIC INVESTMENT IN GOVERNMENT
What are the consequences of bringing for-profit investment and charitable
donations into the public sphere? Does private financing for public programs
offer best-of-both-worlds opportunities to exploit the advantages of public and
private initiative and to avoid the pitfalls associated with each of the sectors? Or
42. See, e.g., Salamon, supra note 23, at 30 (“[G]overnment has emerged as the single most
important source of nonprofit income.”); Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government and Nonprofits: Turning
Points, Challenges, and Opportunities, NONPROFIT Q. (Sept. 21, 2009), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
author/steven-rathgeb-smith/ [https://perma.cc/YV6F-YV5R] (describing government support for
nonprofits).
43. Salamon, supra note 23.
44. For a discussion of the “make or buy” decision more generally, see Paul L. Joskow, Vertical
Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 319 (Claude Menard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2008).
45. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 738 (6th ed. 2015) (“Once you
begin to take the idea of privatization seriously, you can quickly come to the view that government could
be reduced to the performance of three tasks: the collection of revenue by taxation, the choice of services
this revenue should buy, and the negotiation and drafting (and, perhaps, the monitoring) of contracts
with private businesses for the delivery of the chosen services.”).
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does the hybridization undermine what is special about government, or private
markets, or philanthropy, without a corresponding bump in benefits? Although
this article cannot answer those questions conclusively, this Part and the next
outline some of the key considerations, suggesting reasons for both optimism and
concern.
A. Public-Private Partnerships
The first public-private combination we consider is of the for-profit variety:
so-called public-private partnerships, also known as PPPs or P3s. Like more
conventional modes of privatization, P3s typically feature the outsourcing of
government functions: rather than developing and/or delivering a service to the
public itself, government engages a private firm to do the work.46 But P3s take
the role of the private sector one step further, by combining private performance
of government functions with private financing of the relevant projects.
Public-private partnerships tend to take one of two forms. In the first type,
known as a demand-risk P3, a private developer fronts the money for a
government project in exchange for the right to collect user fees that would
otherwise have gone to the government.47 The second type of partnership is
known as an availability-payment P3. Under the availability model, the
government commits to paying the private partner(s) a set amount contingent on
the project’s meeting certain quality benchmarks. Initial financing comes in
whole or in part from the private entity, which then handles the work, while the
government makes regular payments to cover operating and maintenance costs
and to service any debt.48
Public-private partnerships first emerged in the 1990s in the United Kingdom
and in Australia, where the availability-payment model is most common. In Latin
America, by contrast, P3s typically have taken the form of demand-risk projects.
The U.S. market was dominated by demand-risk projects in its early stages, but
is now shifting toward availability-payment P3s.49 P3s are currently used primarily
for large infrastructural projects, including transportation initiatives such as
roads, bridges, parking meters, and the like.50 Private investment is less common,
46. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2003)
(describing the prevalent model of privatization in the United States as “government use of private
entities to implement government programs or to provide services to others on the government’s
behalf”).
47. MOODY’S, supra note 4.
48. Id. (describing availability-payment P3s).
49. Id.; see generally MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., CERTAIN US P3 OBLIGATIONS WILL BE
TREATED AS GOVERNMENT DEBT (Feb. 2, 2015) (describing trend toward availability-payment P3s).
50. Ryan Holeywell, The Indiana Toll Road: A Model for Privatization?, GOVERNING MAG. (Oct.
2011),
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/indiana-toll-road-model-privatization.html
[https://perma.cc/6SZM-W5MN] (“[G]overnments’ desire for P3s is on the rise. With state and federal
highway budgets stretched, lawmakers are reluctant to supplement them with higher gas taxes or general
fund revenue. That makes P3s an attractive option, and in some circles they have been portrayed as a
miracle cure for the country’s crumbling infrastructure.”).
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but not unheard of, in the context of social infrastructure—examples include
hospitals, schools, and prisons, among others.51
In the eyes of their supporters, P3s combine the efficiency of the private
market with the government’s ability to avoid certain types of market failures.52
In short, private firms may be able to deliver services more cheaply than the
government. Private contractors typically cost less than public employees, in part
because they lack the civil-service protections and generous benefits that
government workers often receive. And private firms have ample incentives to
drive down costs as much as possible so as to maximize profits. Competition for
lucrative government contracts sharpens those incentives.
In some areas, arguments like these might justify a complete shift from public
to private provision of the relevant services. And, indeed, in some countries that
is precisely what the term “privatization” refers to—rather than running, say, a
water utility itself, the government sells it to private entities and gets out of the
business altogether.53 But in areas where it is difficult to establish competitive
market prices—natural monopolies, for example, or services that generate
significant externalities—concerns about potential market failures may justify a
continued role for government.54 Thus, the argument goes, public-private
hybrids, or partnerships, can harness the relative strengths of both the public and
private sectors to produce better results than could be expected from either
sector working alone.55
There are several reasons to hesitate before accepting this sunny vision of P3s.
The first will be familiar to readers who are steeped in the literature on
privatization more generally. As the previous Part explained, one of the reasons
for market failure—and, by extension, for reliance on government to supply
particular kinds of products and services—is that it is difficult for consumers to
monitor the quality of outputs. In scenarios that feature such informational
asymmetries between producers and consumers, competition among profitseeking firms will not reliably lead to better products and enhanced efficiency.
On the contrary, the profit motive may lead firms to focus on easily measurable
indicia of quality and to shirk on attributes that, although important, are harder
to observe. One solution, then, is to rely on service-providers who lack the

51. MOODY’S, supra note 4 (predicting that “social-infrastructure projects will continue to be in the
justice and education sectors, with water and waste-water P3 projects to follow”).
52. INT’L MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 10 (Mar. 12, 2004) (approved by
Teresa Ter-Minassian) (“[S]tandard arguments for and against government ownership . . . can be used to
motivate PPPs as a means of combining the relative strengths of government and private provision in a
way that responds to market failure but minimizes the risk of government failure.”); WORLD BANK
REPORT, OVERCOMING CONSTRAINTS TO THE FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (Jan. 2014)
(“Conceptually, PPPs are an instrument to respond to market failures while minimizing public sector
short-comings as a service provider.”).
53. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 222 (describing privatization abroad).
54. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 52, at 10.
55. Id.
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incentive to maximize profit—namely, government and/or nonprofits.56
The difficulty here should be obvious. If a major justification for government
action is that the combination of informational asymmetries and profit motive
produces undesirable outcomes, then outsourcing service-provision to private
firms creates more problems than it solves. Whether this problem is likely to arise
in the context of a given P3 depends in large part on whether it is possible for the
government to specify in advance the hallmarks of a job well done. As others
have recognized, “private provision may be workable if the government can write
a fully specified, enforceable contract with the private sector.”57 But where
“service quality is noncontractible”58—perhaps because means matter along with
ends,59 or where success entails hard-to-pin-down values like “tender loving
care”60—relying on private firms to deliver governmental services risks importing
private market failure into the public sphere. This importation risk is significant
where the government is not any better positioned than consumers to address the
issues that lead to market failure, such as information asymmetry.
A second objection to P3s is that the best-of-both-worlds argument supplies
little reason to favor private financing; it focuses, instead, on the capacity of the
private market to generate efficiencies in the production and delivery of goods
and services. Recall that one of the reasons why government is able to avoid the
sorts of failures that bedevil the private market is that it has the power to tax—
to compel payment from consumers who might otherwise be unwilling to
contribute to the cost of collective goods.61 The advantage evaporates, however,
if government must rely on voluntary investments from private firms. At the very
least, it is far from clear that such investments will flow to the sorts of collectivegoods projects that would otherwise be undersupplied by the private sector.62
56. See WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 45–46.
57. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 52, at 11.
58. Id. (“In general, services for which overall quality is inherently noncontractible . . . are not
candidates for PPPs . . . .”).
59. DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 79 (explaining that outsourcing is most attractive in circumstances
where ends matter more than means, because “[t]he more precisely a task can be specified in advance
and its performance evaluated after the fact, the more certainly contractors can be made to compete”).
60. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 50.
61. Cf. id. at 20 (“[T]he advantage that government has in its ability to tax, which bypasses private
firms’ dependence on prices or user fees, is an advantage in fund raising, not in production.”).
62. The problem flagged here may be ameliorated by an investment tool that is related to P3s but
still in its infancy in the U.S.: the social impact bond (SIB), also known as “pay for success” or “social
innovation bonds.” SIBs ameliorate some of the concerns about subject-matter skew associated with
P3s, because they tend to focus on public policies that lack any clear profit component. They work as
follows: “Money from private donors and philanthropic dollars are invested upfront to help get the
program off the ground. If the program meets the predetermined requirements over a specified time, the
money is returned [by the government, with interest].” Bill Bradley, Social Impact Bonds: Beneficial or
Bureaucracy-Bloating?, NEXT CITY (May 8, 2014), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/senate-hearing-socialimpact-bonds-helpful-harmful [https://perma.cc/UZ2S-QWB2]; see also Matthew Bishop & Michael
Green, Philanthrocapitalism Rising, 52 SOCIETY 541, 542 (2015) (“This is a way to transfer the risk of
innovative public policy initiatives to the private sector, tapping non-profit operational expertise and for
profit risk appetite.”); SOCIAL FINANCE, HOW PAY FOR SUCCESS WORKS, http://socialfinance.org/how-
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This problem is most pressing in the context of demand-risk P3s, where the
private investment is recouped primarily through user fees—payments by
consumers who drive on toll roads, for example, or who use municipal parking
spaces. From the perspective of would-be investors, that kind of deal makes no
sense in areas that lend themselves to free riding, where private market failures
would be most likely. It works only where consumers are, in fact, willing to pay
for the service in question or where they can be compelled by the government to
pay. To the extent that the service would not have been supplied on the open
market, then, the reason is not market failure but government monopoly—a
monopoly that the P3 effectively transfers to a private firm.63
Availability-payment P3s may hold more promise in combining the
government’s ability to avoid market failures with private-market efficiency. Like
privatization more generally, the availability-payment model puts government
itself in the role of consumer. Payment will come—ultimately—from the public
coffers; the up-front private investment simply operates as a way of putting off
the payday.
Yet to the extent that P3s simply delay, as opposed to obviate, the need for
public financing, they trigger a third reason for hesitation. The ready money
provided by private investors allows today’s public officials to take credit for
projects that tomorrow’s officials, and citizens, will have to pay for. Concerns
about similar temporal dynamics have prompted many state governments to
adopt limitations on allowable public debt.64 P3s tend not to trigger those
limitations, however, because the obligation in question is contingent on certain
performance benchmarks; in the argot of public finance, a contingent obligation
does not count as debt.65 Thus, P3s may offer a means by which government can
evade democratically enacted limitations on public revenue raising. The upshot,
as we describe in more detail in the following Part, is that governments can give
pay-for-success-works/ [https://perma.cc/X6BG-HRBB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (describing how SIBs
are funded). SIBs have been used in the United States to develop programs designed at reducing
recidivism, improving early-childhood education, and facilitating reentry by formerly incarcerated
citizens. Bradley, supra.
63. Monopoly conditions are, of course, another likely source of private market failure. See, e.g.,
Bozeman, supra note 15, at 146. See also Le Grande, supra note 10, at 439–40 (noting that “replacing a
government monopoly provider with a private monopoly might have an inegalitarian impact on that
distribution, because (a) the latter would have more incentive its position to exploit its position to
maximize profits and (b) any profits would accrue to its shareholders instead of to all taxpayers”).
64. As with restrictions on taxes, debt limitations may be substantive or procedural. Substantive
limitations impose caps on debt; procedural rules require government to clear special democratic
hurdles—such as voter approval, approval by a legislative supermajority, or both—before taking on new
debt. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 790 (7th
ed. 2009). See also id. at 818 (explaining that limitations on debt “may be justified as a means of
reconciling the conflict between short-term and long-term interest that debt creates . . . . [T]he ability to
shift the costs of debt into the future may . . . induce elected officials to incur debt too easily [and] to
approve projects that are not fully cost-justified. . . . After all, they can get the credit for the new project,
but the blame for the additional taxes needed to finance these projects or for the diversion of tax dollars
away from other future needs will be borne by their successors.”).
65. Id. at 836.
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lip service to fiscal austerity while offering consumers amenities that they cannot
actually afford at current tax rates.
B. Patriotic Philanthropy
Private investment in government need not be motivated by a quest for
profits. Individuals, groups, and firms also may donate money to government,
much as they might donate to a nonprofit, or give money and other resources
directly to those in need.66 Such “patriotic philanthropy”67 comes in various
shapes and sizes. Some gifts are solicited by government actors.68 Others are
made at the initiative of the donor. Some are open-ended, to be used by the
recipient however it sees fit.69 Others are earmarked for specific purposes.
It is difficult to develop a comprehensive sense of the substance of patriotic
philanthropy, but gifts appear to cluster around certain types of initiatives.70
Public facilities, for example, are recurring subjects of gifts. Relatedly, private
gifts frequently support public exhibitions, both inside museums and outside in
the form of monuments. Public schools also are longstanding—and
controversial—targets of philanthropic giving. Public education was one of the
earliest social services offered widely by government,71 and it is one of the few
public services that state governments are constitutionally obligated to provide.72
Yet private dollars have been part of the public-education equation from the
outset, particularly in the South, where Reconstruction governments struggled to

66. See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 27–28; see also Beth Gazley, How
Philanthropy Props Up Public Services and Why We Should Care, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 27, 2015) (giving
to government is not new. As we have argued elsewhere, however, there is reason to think that the
phenomenon is on the rise in the U.S.: “We know that philanthropic support for public services is growing
rapidly, outpacing the growth of the charitable sector overall.”).
67. E.g., Sophie Gilbert, David Rubenstein’s Patriotic Philanthropy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/10/david-rubensteins-patriotic-philanthropy/382082/
[https://perma.cc/BYH9-B5VZ].
68. Jim Edwards, Why BP is Getting Fed Up with Florida Milking it for Advertising Money,
MONEYWATCH (July 15, 2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-bp-is-getting-fed-up-with-floridamilking-it-for-advertising-money/ [https://perma.cc/RB7F-Q6RU] (describing requests from Florida’s
Governor Charlie Crist to BP for $75 million to support cleanup and tourism advertising in the wake of
the BP oil spill).
69. See David Margolick, Justice Holmes’ 1935 Bequest Remains Unfulfilled, N.Y. TIMES (May 3,
1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/03/us/justice-holmes-s-1935-bequest-remains-unfulfilled.html?
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/HR8E-SEY8] (an example is the Holmes Devise: “When Oliver
Wendell Holmes died in 1935, he left the bulk of his estate, more than $260,000, to the United States
Government. It was the largest unrestricted gift ever made to the American people . . . .”).
70. See generally Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, Part II.C (offering examples).
71. David Strong et al., Leveraging the State: Private Money and the Development of Public
Education for Blacks, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 658, 659 (2000) (“Publicly funded and controlled systems of
education were one of the earliest social benefits extended to the masses . . . .”).
72. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1122 (2014) (“While
laws provide an entitlement to a public education, and we have long struggled to interpret what
constitutes a legally adequate education, there is little to nothing to indicate what other services the local
public sector must provide.”).
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fund their newly created state-supported school systems.73
Generalizations become more difficult when we move beyond these recurring
categories. Some gifts offer financial support for law enforcement.74 Others
promote improvements at the other end of the criminal-justice spectrum—for
example, seeking to reduce alcohol abuse among offenders, or to improve the
health and mental-health services offered by juvenile justice systems.75
Community and economic development projects also tend to attract
philanthropic gifts.76 The City of Detroit is perhaps the most striking example in
this regard. Philanthropic organizations have played a leading role in the city’s
revitalization, spearheading a variety of significant initiatives including the M-1
rail—the country’s first public transit system planned by private and
philanthropic actors, and funded largely by a combination of private investments
and gifts.77
Gifts are less common at the federal level than in states and municipalities, in
large part because the default rule under federal law is that donors may not
earmark gifts for particular purposes; instead, all donations must go to the
general treasury.78 That rule can be—and often is—superseded by more targeted
statutes allowing particular agencies or actors to receive private gifts. For
example, the Department of Justice has statutory authority to receive gifts,79 as
does the Federal Communications Commission,80 and the Library of Congress.81
And some federal agencies have their own foundations devoted to raising private
donations; examples include the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, the
Food and Drug Administration, the National Air and Space Administration,82
73. See Strong et al., supra note 71, at 662–63 (describing the need for private donations to support
public schools for both White and Black children in the South during Reconstruction, and how private
financing continued to fill the void for many southern African-Americans after states started channeling
public money exclusively into White schools).
74. See David Amsden, Who Runs the Streets of New Orleans?, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/magazine/who-runs-the-streets-of-new-orleans.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZSC-ZXXH] (describing gifts to law enforcement in Seattle and New Orleans).
75. See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 32 (describing such gifts in California and
Michigan).
76. Id. manuscript at 32–33.
77. Id. manuscript at 33.
78. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires federal agencies to turn over any funds to the general
treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2016), and the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits agencies from expending
funds in excess of their legislative appropriations, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2016). Close cousins to gifts
to the general treasury, the Bureau of Fiscal Service may accept gifts to reduce the national debt. Over
the last decade, totals have ranged from $2 to $7 million. See Gift Contributions to Reduce Debt Held by
DIRECT,
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/gift/gift.htm
the
Public,
TREASURY
[https://perma.cc/D6XR-BT8U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 524(d) (2016).
80. 47 U.S.C. § 154(g)(3) (2016).
81. 2 U.S.C. § 156 (2016).
82. Rick Cohen, Philanthropy Funding Government Work? There’s a Foundation for That—Several,
Actually, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 13, 2012), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2012/04/13/philanthropyfunding-government-work-theres-a-foundation-for-thatseveral-actually/
[https://perma.cc/XZ3N-
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and the National Park Service.83
Even if the federal environment were more conducive to targeted gift giving,
we suspect that the majority of gifts would still be aimed at state and local
governments. Not only do state and local governments have greater needs for
funds, but the smaller scale of local government creates more opportunities for
gifts with meaningful impact. Perhaps not coincidentally, state and local law on
gifts ranges from broadly permissive to silent, with only scattered restrictions.84
As with P3s, there is an optimistic best-of-both-worlds story to be told about
patriotic philanthropy. For those who harbor anxieties about private
philanthropy because of concerns about accountability, transparency, and
abdication of the government’s obligations, gifts to government may well look
like a cure-all. The government is under no obligation to accept donations, nor
to undertake the specific initiatives that private donors wish to fund. Unlike
conventional philanthropy, then, patriotic philanthropy means that initiatives
backed by private actors with big ideas and deep pockets must pass through a
democratic check before being translated into projects with broad-based effects.
There is also reason to believe that patriotic philanthropy might generate
more private support for public projects than taxation alone. Research on
taxation and charitable giving suggests that people are more willing to turn over
their money to Uncle Sam when they can earmark the funds. One study
concluded, for example, that “the antipathy often expressed toward taxation is
due more to coercion or lack of control over the use of resources, rather than to
government per se, and that taxpayers embrace the voluntary, earmarked feature
of a gift to a specific government agency.”85
Despite the manifest benefits of patriotic philanthropy, there are reasons for
concern here as well. The previous section suggested that bringing for-profit
investment into government could exacerbate rather than minimize concerns
about government failure without doing much to reduce the potential for market
failure. The argument here is similar: Notwithstanding the optimistic vision
sketched above, there is a risk that running private gifts through government will
deepen rather than resolve democratic objections.
Patriotic philanthropy avoids the process-based objections to purely private
philanthropy if, and only if, proposed gifts pass through a meaningful democratic
process on their way to implementation. In at least some cases, however, gifts
may change the democratic process, by skewing government priorities in the
8KG5]. The CIA also has a foundation, In-Q-Tel, but it is more of an investment arm than a source of
philanthropic donations. See IN-Q-TEL, https://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/ [https://perma.cc/C3CF-BBK9]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (“IQT is the non-profit strategic investor that accelerates the development
and delivery of cutting-edge technologies to U.S. government agencies that keep our nation safe.”).
83. See About the Foundation, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org/aboutfoundation [https://perma.cc/57ED-EJ2E] (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
84. See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 34 & n.202.
85. Sherry Xin Li et al., Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, 95 J. PUB. ECON.
1190, 1191 (2011).
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direction of initiatives backed by private dollars. The key point here is that
government officials may find it hard to turn down donations, especially big ones,
and especially those that are offered by donors with whom the officials have—or
might develop—ongoing relationships.86 First, officials may worry about the
public-relations consequences of declining what appears to be free money.
Particularly at a time when many government units are struggling to make ends
meet, news that officials have foregone an opportunity to pad the public coffers
may not sit well with voters. Second, and perhaps more significantly, officials may
be concerned about the likely reactions of donors and would-be donors. In many
cases, the proffer of a gift is not an isolated event but one moment in an ongoing
and potentially beneficial relationship. Today’s gift, if handled well, may produce
additional gifts down the road.87 The people who are capable of making large
donations to government programs also are people who are likely to provide
other kinds of political support, including campaign contributions and
independent expenditures.88 Saying “thanks but no thanks” to such donors may
seem imprudent at best, “political malpractice” at worst.89 Instead, as one critic
put it, “[w]hen a multibillionaire gets an idea . . . [about] matters of important
public policy and the billionaire is willing to back it up with hard cash, public
officials tend to reach for the money with one hand and their marching orders
with the other.”90
Even if public officials are capable of declining proffered gifts, policy
proposals that come with their own readymade funding sources—requiring
reduced or delayed public outlays—will likely have an edge over initiatives that
must be fully funded from the public fisc. That gravitational pull, moreover, is
not limited to the initial bargain but extends through the life of the project. Losing
private funding may seem even worse than refusing a gift at the outset. Thus, the
same incentives that push government officials to reach for the money may also
encourage them to hold tightly to funding already secured—even if doing so
means contributing public money to the project or compromising other
objectives.91 Similarly, when and if the worst happens and the private money runs
86. See Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 35–41.
87. Cf. Cohen, supra note 82 (describing research suggesting that “nonprofits have traditionally
been averse to challenging their foundation funders . . . for fear of losing not only current funders but
scaring off other foundations”).
88. Goss, supra note 34, at 443 (“Donors also carry the promise of campaign cash, necessary to
compete in the campaign finance arms race.”).
CITY
PAPER
(Feb.
13,
2004),
89. David
Morton,
Miss
Manor,
WASH.
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/article/13028437/miss-manor [https://perma.cc/33B3-AJ8N]
(quoting the D.C. Mayor regarding a proffered gift).
90. Bob Herbert, The Plot Against Public Education: How Millionaires and Billionaires are Ruining
Our Schools, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/the-plotagainst-public-education-111630 [https://perma.cc/LFR2-ZX6U].
91. See, e.g., Landow & Ebdon, supra note 6, at 737–46 (describing how city leaders in Omaha,
Nebraska, acceded to the demands of private donors who had funded a new convention center and arena
and then used the threat of withdrawing private funding to gain continuing leverage in negotiations over
related projects).
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out, sunk costs and reliance interests are likely to bias public decision making in
favor of maintaining programs already in effect. Importantly, those ongoing
effects often will spill over into other policy spheres, as gifts draw money and
other resources toward donor-supported initiatives and away from alternative
uses.
The upshot is that patriotic philanthropy has the potential to induce
government to undertake initiatives that would not otherwise be pursued. That
can, of course, be a good thing: If the reasons why government would not
otherwise have pursued the projects reflect public-choice dysfunctions or other
sorts of government failures, the lure of seemingly free money can pull
government in beneficial directions. But patriotic philanthropy can also
contribute to, and exacerbate, the risk of governmental failure by making
government all the more dependent on and responsive to moneyed interests.
IV
A BIGGER PIE?
The discussion thus far has offered several reasons to hesitate before
embracing private financing of government as a win-win scenario. An obvious
response is that private money—whether of the for-profit or philanthropic
variety—simply expands the public pie. Private financing, in other words,
supplements the public treasury, leaving more money available to the state to
focus on other priorities. For small-government conservatives, that response is
hardly a cause for comfort. In this Part, we argue that the notion of an everexpanding pie should ring false even to those who would favor a larger public
sector. As the old adage suggests, there are reasons to be skeptical that free
money is in fact free.
A. Reliance and Redistribution
An initial reason for skepticism about the expanding-pie perspective is
suggested by the discussion in the previous Part: Private financing might
disappear for various reasons, and the state may be compelled to pick up the slack
in funding, diverting resources from other potential uses. Private financing is
significantly less dependable than broad-based, compulsory taxation, because it
is based on the voluntary actions of a relatively small set of individuals or firms
rather than payments extracted from the taxpaying public as a whole.92
Proponents of using private funds to support public programs must therefore
contend with the possibility that the private money might run out.93
92. Cf. Salamon, supra note 23, at 40 (noting that “the voluntary system . . . has serious drawbacks
as a generator of a reliable stream of resources to respond adequately to community needs”).
93. Indeed, many P3s are designed with the intention that the private money will run out; the whole
point is that the private “partners” provide an initial investment, which the government repays (with
interest, of course) down the road. In these circumstances, any expansion of the public pie is temporary
at best, and triggers the concerns about public officials’ incentives for temporal cost-shifting that we
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One possibility, of course, is that privately funded programs simply exist as
long as the private money is flowing into the public sphere. If the money goes
away, so too do the programs—no harm, no foul. But it will not always be that
easy. Once in place, public programs may be difficult to unwind. That is true not
only of social infrastructure and programs (think public schools, for example) but
also of the kind of transportation projects that tend to attract the most P3s. It is
one thing to live without a new road. It is another to clear the countryside,
construct a freeway, and then leave it to crumble into disuse when funding for
upkeep evaporates. When reliance interests develop around particular initiatives,
government may face intense pressure to keep them going—with public funds, if
necessary.
To be clear, the point here is not that it is always, or necessarily, cause for
concern when private financing must be replaced with public support. On the
contrary, private financing may operate as a spur to development or innovation
in the public sector, encouraging the government to experiment with new
programs and policies. The private, or voluntary, sector bears the initial risk of
failure; tax dollars are put at stake if and when the projects in question prove to
be successful. We do not deny that beneficial public policies can emerge from
such scenarios.94 Yet recognizing the potential benefits need not mean ignoring
the risks. If, as we have suggested, there is likely to be a political thumb on the
scale in favor of programs that attract outside financing at the outset, we should
be clear-eyed about the role that private money is playing in shaping the
government’s priorities. And we should recognize that the fact that private
money is supporting a program today does not mean it always will. In some cases,
at least, private financing is likely to result in a redistribution of public resources
rather than an expansion of the overall pie.
B. Free Riding and Reverse Crowding Out
Private financing for government might also affect the public fisc indirectly
and over the long term, by shaping citizens’ preferences regarding public funding
and taxation. There is ample evidence that public and private financing for public
goods are sometimes substitutes rather than complements. As the significant
literature on “crowding out” shows, governmental support for public goods
sometimes displaces, or crowds out, private donations.95 A similar phenomenon

flagged in the previous Part.
94. See, e.g., Strong et al., supra note 71, at 662, 672–75 (explaining how initial private financing
ultimately led to public funding of schools for African-American children in the south, and describing
the initial donation as “a Trojan horse [that] allow[ed] blacks to ‘sneak past’ the normal barriers erected
to their political influence”).
95. See, e.g., James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising?
Evidence from a Panel of Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 334 (2011) (“The classic theory of crowding
out is that individual donors, who are also often tax payers, will treat their voluntary private contributions
as a substitute for their involuntary contributions through taxation and, as a result, reduce giving to a
charity by the full amount of the [government] grant [to a charity].”).
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could arise in the context of private financing for government, just in the other
direction: private money might crowd out public money. We refer to this
phenomenon as reverse crowding out.96
Consider the crowding-out question from the perspective of a citizen who
lives in a world in which public goods can be funded either with public dollars or
via private donations or investments. For present purposes, this hypothetical
assumes a fully informed citizen: She knows that financing can in principle be
either public or private, and she knows how programs are funded in fact. The
citizen must ask herself why she should pay for public goods when someone else
could pay for them. All else equal, the rational, self-interested taxpayer would
prefer a world in which she has access to public goods but does not have to shell
out for them. The more private money that is available to finance public goods,
the more the fully informed taxpayer ought to favor a reduction in her tax liability
in favor of private support.
To the extent that this reverse crowding out story is correct, it reveals a deeper
and more perverse problem: It transfers the free-rider problem from the private
market to government. As explained in Part I, the government’s role in the
provision of public goods is justified, in part, by its ability to address the
shortcomings of the private market. One such shortcoming is the free-rider
problem, in which an individual has an incentive to consume a public good but
no incentive to pay for it. Government can solve this version of market failure
because it can compel its citizens to pay taxes to support the state’s priorities. It
can force everyone to pay for public goods, whether they consume them or not,
and whether they would prefer to pay for them or not.
As many states and local governments have learned, however, the
government’s compulsory power is not without a significant limitation. Citizens
must be willing to authorize the government to levy taxes. Once authorized, the
levy is compulsory, but voters can impose substantial constraints on the
government’s taxing power. Many states have adopted rules, either statutory or
constitutional, that require proposed tax increases to run through legislative
supermajorities or voter referenda, and/or that cap the permissible level of
taxation.97 And even where taxes are set via normal legislative procedures, citizen
opposition can make even modest tax increases extraordinarily difficult to enact
as a political matter.
In the absence of private funding of government-supplied public goods,
citizens have a choice to make. They can either have the goods they want and pay
for them in taxes, or they can stake out opposition to taxes and live with the

96. Cf. WEISBROD, supra note 1, at 30 (recognizing the possibility of philanthropic contributions to
government agencies, and observing that “voluntary contributions [may] not lead to increased
governmental output, but to an offsetting decrease in tax-financed expenditures. . . . At issue is the
magnitude of ‘crowding out’: increased private donations may decrease what government would
otherwise have done.”).
97. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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resulting reduction in public goods. But citizens cannot expect to benefit from
government-supplied goods and services without chipping in toward the cost. The
availability of private funding for the government’s priorities introduces free
riding into the calculus, because fully informed citizens now have the option of
having the public good for free. One consequence of private financing, then, may
be to reduce citizens’ appetite for taxes.
The concern here is exacerbated by the fact that citizens may oppose
particular government programs, either on grounds of principle or policy, or
simply because they do not anticipate taking advantage of them. Tax payments
cannot, of course, be earmarked, and taxes cannot be avoided on the ground that
the would-be payer will not benefit from some or all of the services government
provides.98 But private donations and investments can be earmarked, and they
are voluntary. In that sense, private financing represents a move from a
compulsory and collective ethos of funding—in which all taxpayers contribute to
the full range of government programs, including those that redound to the
benefit of others—to a voluntary, a la carte approach in which individuals and
firms choose which initiatives their money supports.99 The more the latter
approach appears to be an option—an alternative to conventional sources of
public financing—the more difficulty government may face in drumming up
political support for taxes.
C. The Hollow State
Crowding out depends upon information symmetry: The citizen has the same
information as the government as to how public priorities are funded. Where
citizens suffer from an information deficit vis-à-vis the state, they may not realize
that free riding is an option, or that public money may be replaced by private
dollars. Such information asymmetry may give rise to a different (albeit related)
problem, one we term “the hollow state.”
Information asymmetry with respect to the funding of public priorities
precludes citizens from having an accurate gauge of the capacities and
capabilities of the state. When the government’s financing scheme is not
transparent and citizens are unaware that public programs are being propped up
by private dollars, citizens may have an inflated sense of what their taxes can buy.
98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
99. As we have explained in other work,
[t]o the extent that individuals can control the amount or use of their tax payments, they do so
not as consumers—making self-interested determinations about what services they want and
how much they are willing to pay—but by voting as citizens. As such, broad-based taxes both
reflect and reinforce a form of ‘fiscal citizenship,’ which one performs ‘by contributing one’s
appropriate share—however modest—toward the financing of the political community of which
one is a member,’ and then ‘by becoming informed about government taxing and spending
policies, and by becoming involved (at least as a voter, and perhaps more deeply) in the
determination of those policies.’
Lemos & Charles, supra note 5, manuscript at 7 (quoting LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE
FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 17 (2013)).
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That is, they may assume, reasonably, that government services are being funded
by public money. As a result, citizens may believe that the public treasury is
capable of producing more goods and services than it actually is. This enables the
government either to claim that it is being financially austere, and/or to brag
about its capacity, while in reality providing services that it cannot afford at
existing tax levels.100
This kind of fiscal delusion might lower the public appetite for taxes, though
for different reasons than the crowding-out concern described above. Even those
who generally favor a robust state might oppose tax increases, based on the
mistaken view that existing tax rates are sufficient to generate all of the public
programs that they observe. Meanwhile, citizens who perceive that the
government is doing too much might seek to limit or lower the government’s
taxing power, which might further debilitate an already hobbled state. The
effects, moreover, would not be felt across the range of government projects, but
only those that are unable to attract private financing. As suggested in the
previous Part, that is unlikely to be a random sample. On the contrary, it is likely
to consist primarily of the kinds of programs for which society needs government
most—because private support, either of the for-profit or philanthropic variety,
would not be forthcoming without compulsion.
Finally, the points we made at the outset of this Part bear repeating here:
Constituencies and reliance interests can develop around existing programs,
making those programs painful to dismantle if and when the private money runs
out. We suggested above that one consequence is that public money may be
pulled toward what were once private initiatives, diverting resources from other
potential uses. But in some circumstances, there may not be any public money
available to be repurposed. The state’s coffers may simply be empty. Thus,
private financing may induce citizens to rely on public programs that they—and
their government—cannot really afford, and to incur heavy switching costs (in
terms of disruption, waste, and the like) if those programs have to be abandoned
down the line.
V
CONCLUSION
An increasingly common refrain in public discourse is that “[g]overnment
can’t do it alone,”101 but needs help from the private and philanthropic sectors in
100. See David Hall, Why Public-Private Partnerships Don’t Work: The Many Advantages of the
Public Alternative, PSIRU 13 (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/files/2015-03PPP-WhyPPPsdontworkEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QNL-T4NS] (describing, and criticizing, the link
between fiscal austerity policies and an embrace of P3s abroad).
101. Christopher Weber, The Problem with Public-Private Partnerships, NEXTCITY (May 7, 2012),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/the-problem-with-public-private-partnerships
[https://perma.cc/99F6KXM4] (quoting Jacksonville mayor Alvin Brown); see also Carol Ebdon & Paul Landow, The Balancing
Act: Using Private Money for Public Projects, 32 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 2012, at 59 (noting that
“[t]he estimated investment needs [for infrastructure] over the next five years are $2.2 trillion, which is
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order to satisfy its obligations to the public. Yet we lack a coherent account of
the relationship between private financing and public legitimacy. Does it matter
for the legitimacy of a representative democracy that citizens broadly finance
their government?102
It might be that the best way to think about financing questions is from a
utilitarian perspective: We ought to favor the mechanisms that deliver public
goods to the public most efficiently. But that approach would ignore a
fundamental argument from democratic theory. The lesson of modern
democratic theory is that process matters—that a robust political process is the
best way of ensuring that decisions about public policy are made in the interest
of the public. American representative democracy envisions a government,
elected by the people, that sets public priorities in the public interest. It assumes
a certain set of values, like equal citizenship.
It further assumes, as formal matter, that each citizen has both rights and
obligations, which include voting as well as taxation. Borrowing Hirschman’s
terms, everyone is presumed to have voice and to reciprocate with loyalty and
not exit.103 Public financing is consistent with that vision, as it collectivizes the
costs of public goods and eliminates the opportunity to opt out. As we have
emphasized, citizens cannot avoid paying general taxes on the ground that they
find certain government policies unnecessary or even offensive. In contrast to
private financing, which enables those with means to use their personal funds to
support the public initiatives that they prefer, general taxes force everyone to
have skin in the game.
If excessive private financing for government is inconsistent with key
assumptions of democratic theory, what are its consequences for the public
sector? If private financing does not simply supplement the existing work of
government but changes it, should that be cause for celebration or regret? We do
not purport to solve those fundamental questions in this brief essay. Our aim is
significantly more modest and much less quixotic. Using public-private
partnerships and patriotic philanthropy as points of ingress, we seek to highlight
some of the benefits and risks of financing the public sector via organizations,
and methods, typically associated with the private and philanthropic sectors.
More broadly, we hope to stimulate a conversation about the consequences of
relying on private funding for public priorities.

beyond the collective ability of government to fund”); Stacia A. Wells & Robert M. Siegel, Fixing US
Infrastructure: New Model P3 Law A Good Start, LAW 360 (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.law360.com/
articles/751657/fixing-us-infrastructure-new-model-p3-law-a-good-start [https://perma.cc/UTY5-D7VZ]
(“[T]he United States is facing an infrastructure crisis and our needs are far greater than the government
can provide on its own. Private capital and innovation are available to help.”).
102. Cf. ZELENAK, supra note 99, at 21 (“Taxpayer status is usually asserted as a reason why the
speaker’s opinion on some question of government policy deserves to be taken seriously.”).
103. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 77–78 (1970).

